Belichick Made the Right Call

Tonight's classic Pats-Colts game featured one of the most interesting coaching decisions in recent memory - Belichick going for it on 4th and 2 at his own 28 with 2:00 left ahead by 6.  Of course, since the call didn't work, Belichick is now getting ripped by every sportswriter in the country.  But if you take the hindsight out of it, it was the right call.  He figured (correctly) that the most important consideration was keeping Manning off the field at all costs, and made a ballsy decision that (unfortunately for him) didn't work.

I was going to run the numbers on it to confirm my intuition, but I see that some geeks already did the calculations and found that the Pats had about a 9% better chance of winning if they went for it on 4th:

With 2:00 left and the Colts with only one timeout, a successful conversion wins the game for all practical purposes. A 4th and 2 conversion would be successful 60% of the time. Historically, in a situation with 2:00 left and needing a TD to either win or tie, teams get the TD 53% of the time from that field position. The total WP for the 4th down conversion attempt would therefore be:

(0.60 * 1) + (0.40 * (1-0.53)) = 0.79 WP

A punt from the 28 typically nets 38 yards, starting the Colts at their own 34. Teams historically get the TD 30% of the time in that situation. So the punt gives the Pats about a 0.70 WP. 

As the article goes on to explain, these percentages are based on league-wide averages, not based on playing against the Colts' offense.  In particular, going for it on 4th down becomes an even better play for New England taking into account how badly they had been clowned by Manning & Co. on the previous drive (79 yards in 1:45 of no-huddle without even bothering to use a timeout).  Realistically, the Colts' success percentage from Pats territory (after a 4th down failure) should go from about 53% to 75%, and let's give them a 50% chance of scoring from their own 34 (after a punt).  Using the same equation as above, that gives the Pats a 70% chance of winning if they go for it on 4th down and a 50% chance if they punt.  (You could also give the Pats better than 60% to convert, considering that they have one of the league's best offenses, which would make it an even clearer case for going for it).  The bottom line is that Belichick made the decision that gave his team the best chance to win on the road against the best team and best quarterback in football.  

It's also very interesting to me to listen to the simple-minded commentary from the former players and coaches on TV (like Dungy and Harrison) criticizing Belichick for not doing what "everyone knows" you're "supposed" to do.  The type of relatively simple analysis found on these geeks' website is readily available to any NFL coaching staff or anyone covering the league, but apparently nobody associated with the NFL is aware that it exists.  This league-wide ignorance may create an opening for a team like the Redskins (after Zorn is fired) to hire a coach who is willing to buck the conventional wisdom in situations like this and give his team an edge.  For example, maybe we can fire our punter and go for it on every 4th down.

Comments

[ETM]

Gotta read Simmons' article about this. He argues that stats don't measure everything in football. Makes some compelling points.